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Merkel’s	Germany	needs	to	show	stronger
commitment	and	responsibility	in	Europe
Has	Germany	shown	enough	solidarity	with	other	EU	states	during	the	Covid-19	outbreak?	John
Ryan	explains	that	the	future	development	of	the	EU	will	depend	largely	on	whether	Berlin	is	willing	to
assume	leadership	and	work	closely	with	Paris.	Under	Merkel’s	leadership	this	commitment	has	been
lacking,	so	it	will	most	likely	fall	on	a	new	chancellor	to	keep	the	EU	and	Eurozone	together.
Before	the	Covid-19	pandemic	struck,	the	CDU/CSU/SPD	coalition	government	in	Germany	had
seemingly	run	out	of	steam,	and	disaffection	among	Germans	had	become	noticeable.	Chancellor	Angela
Merkel’s	conservatives	had	done	badly	over	the	last	couple	of	years	in	most	elections.
But	now,	only	a	few	weeks	later,	Germans	are	suddenly	overwhelmingly	in	support	of	their	government	again.
Citizens	clearly	tend	to	place	trust	in	the	political	leadership	they	know	during	times	of	crisis.	Germany’s	health
system	has	proved	particularly	competent	at	responding	to	different	stages	of	coronavirus	infections	across	the
country.
Despite	some	of	these	displays	of	structural	strength,	Germany,	once	a	powerhouse	in	European	diplomacy	on	the
world	stage,	is	on	the	retreat.	The	next	German	government	is	likely	to	either	lack	the	political	will	or	the	consensus
to	significantly	enhance	Germany’s	power	in	international	affairs.	It	will	take	a	major	external	shock	to	upset	Berlin’s
pragmatic	inclinations.	The	paradigm	of	an	“ever	closer	union”	has	been	lost	in	German	and	European	politics.
German	leaders	have	given	up	on	the	concept.	French	president	Emmanuel	Macron	may	purport	to	defend	it,	but
the	Gaullist	ingredients	of	his	own	Europe	strategy	weaken	his	claim.	Europeans	will	not	be	shapers	but	observers
of	events	in	the	future	–	although	this	may	not	become	obvious	or	painful	any	time	soon.	The	EU’s	return	to	the
global	stage	has	been	lost	in	the	muddling	through	of	the	twenty-first	century	and	Germany	bears	a	special
responsibility	for	this.
It	can	be	felt	in	Berlin,	in	Brussels,	and	in	many	other	capitals	around	the	European	Union:	Europe	is	not	what	it
used	to	be.	As	the	geopolitical	winds	have	turned	and	blown	into	the	faces	of	European	leaders,	confidence	in	their
ability	to	address	challenges	as	a	union	is	running	low.	Yet	Europe’s	identity	crisis	cannot	be	understood	without
looking	at	Germany.	Once	the	champions	of	an	“ever	closer	union	of	the	peoples	of	Europe”,	the	Germans	appear
to	have	lost	their	compass	due	to	changes	in	Berlin’s	status	in	Europe.
Angela	Merkel	at	a	European	Council	meeting	in	February	2020,	Credit:	European	Union
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If	Europe	is	not	what	it	used	to	be,	this	is	largely	because	Germany	is	not	what	it	long	wanted	to	be.	The	key
question	now	seems	to	be,	how	much	longer	can	the	current	gap	remain	between	the	challenges	to	Europe’s
integrity,	prosperity,	and	security	on	the	one	hand,	and	Berlin’s	ultra-pragmatic,	status	quo-minded	course	of	non-
action	on	the	other?
Chancellor	Angela	Merkel’s	Germany	seems	to	have	given	in	to	the	status	quo,	preferring	erosion	out	of	inaction	to
disruption	out	of	ambition.	Thus,	the	reasonable	option	seems	to	be	to	patiently	manage	the	status	quo,
pragmatically	adding	bits	of	substance	here	and	there	when	the	situation	allows.
Any	agenda	for	“more	Europe”	would	in	any	case	fail	to	win	a	majority	in	the	German	political	class	today	–	or	even
among	German	voters,	despite	their	rather	positive	attitudes	towards	European	integration.	The	Germans	continue
to	like	“more	Europe”	as	a	distant	vision,	but	they	reject	it	as	an	operational	strategy.	The	German	elite	has
developed	a	taste	for	a	national	approach	to	the	European	agenda	–	which,	conveniently,	it	can	pursue	while	using
widespread	doubt	about	the	feasibility	of	deeper	integration	as	cover.	The	national	approach	puts	the	defence	of
one’s	own	short-term	interests	over	presumed	European	interests;	it	helps	fend	off	spending	demands	from	others.
To	be	clear,	pursuing	a	policy	based	on	Germany’s	national	interest	and	strengthening	Germany’s	national	means
could	be	a	new	strategy	for	steering	and	advancing	European	integration.	In	this	scenario,	Berlin	would
demonstrate	its	ability	to	act	independently	of	the	EU	–	something	that	it	could,	in	practical	terms,	articulate	in	the
areas	of	foreign,	security,	and	defence	policy	because	of	their	low	level	of	integration	within	the	union.	Although
costly	in	financial	and	political	terms,	this	much	more	capable	Germany	might	scare	its	European	partners	into
wanting	deeper	integration.	Merkel	would	not	want	to	foster	such	fear	of	Germany	as	she	sees	nothing	to	be	gained
from	it	–	meaning	that	it	would	just	raise	the	transaction	costs	for	Berlin	in	Europe.
The	German	presidency	of	the	EU	will	run	from	July	to	December	2020.	A	successful	presidency,	Merkel	allies
believe,	would	burnish	the	chancellor’s	legacy	as	a	stateswoman	who	helped	hold	Europe	together	and	stood	up	for
global	multilateralism	in	turbulent	times.	The	Covid-19	crisis	has	made	this	very	difficult.
Pandemic	aside,	over	the	same	period,	however,	a	number	of	risks	roll	up	against	such	plans.	This	might	include:
the	election	as	CDU	leader	and	chancellor	candidate	of	a	Merkel-sceptic	with	whom	she	could	not	rub	along;	signs
that	the	authority	split	in	her	party	might	lose	it	the	election	or	make	Germany’s	EU	presidency	a	flop;	and	a	CDU
meltdown	over	China	policy.
This	political	crisis	in	Germany	has	also	cast	doubt	on	the	country’s	ability	to	play	a	more	prominent	role
internationally.	The	US,	for	instance,	has	often	criticised	Germany	for	not	spending	enough	on	defence,
and	Berlin	is	still	far	from	fulfilling	the	pledge	by	NATO	allies	to	spend	2%	of	GDP	on	defence	by	2024.	The	German
military	has	been	under	criticism	for	being	“underequipped,	understaffed	and	overly	bureaucratic,”	as	a	recent
parliamentary	report	revealed.	The	fallout	from	the	2015-2016	refugee	influx	has	polarised	Germany’s	political
landscape	and	hollowed	out	support	for	the	mainstream	parties,	leaving	Merkel	beleaguered	on	all	sides.
In	the	Federal	election	campaign	in	2017,	Merkel	declared	at	a	packed	beer	hall	in	Bavaria	that	it	was	time	for
Europe	to	“take	its	destiny	into	its	own	hands.”	Unfortunately,	Merkel	has	failed	to	keep	that	pledge.	The	European
Union’s	promise	to	form	an	“ever	closer	union”	seems	more	like	an	empty	slogan	than	a	strategy	these	days.	Over
the	last	year,	Merkel	delivered	several	lofty	speeches	about	the	need	to	maintain	European	Union	unity	and	protect
open	societies,	but	she	has	said	little	about	how	those	broad	aims	translate	into	actual	policies.	Merkel	said	in	2012
that	there	would	be	no	eurobonds	“as	long	as	I	live”.	After	nine	European	heads	of	government	wrote	a	joint	letter	in
March	2020	saying	the	EU	needed	to	“work	on	a	common	debt	instrument”,	she	said	pointedly	that	that	was	not
“the	opinion	of	all	member	states”.	Merkel’s	Christian	Democratic	Union	party	remains	opposed.	This	could	prove	to
be	a	big	mistake	politically	and	economically.
The	outlook	for	global	trade	and	the	domestic	economy	is	very	pessimistic,	especially	due	to	the	Covid-19	crisis.
Germany’s	consistently	deficient	defence	spending	makes	it	dependent	on	other	countries	such	as	the	US,	UK	and
France.	A	weakened	and	distracted	Germany	is	the	last	thing	Europe	needs	right	now	and	will	make	it	much	more
difficult	for	France	and	Germany	–	the	twin	engines	of	European	integration	–	to	agree	on	the	necessary	reforms	to
shore	up	the	Eurozone’s	unresolved	governance	problems.
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While	Merkel	may	be	admired	outside	of	the	country	as	the	leader	of	the	western	world,	the	perspective	is	different
from	inside	Germany,	even	if	most	recently	Merkel’s	CDU	has	recovered	sternly	in	the	opinion	polls	and	her
personal	rating	is	strong.	Critics	worry	that	Merkel	has	done	a	poor	job	of	preparing	Germany	for	the	future,	and	it
could	get	worse.	This	is	despite	that	fact	that	she	appears	a	safe	pair	of	hands	in	comparison	to	US	President
Donald	Trump	or	UK	Prime	Minister	Boris	Johnson.	The	future	development	of	the	EU	will	depend	largely	on
whether	Berlin	is	willing	to	assume	leadership	and	work	closely	with	Paris.	Under	Merkel’s	leadership	this
commitment	and	sense	of	responsibility	has	been	lacking.	It	will	therefore	most	likely	be	up	to	a	new	chancellor	to
renew	the	partnership	with	France	in	order	to	keep	the	EU	and	Eurozone	together.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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